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Abstract 
In this paper the concept of rank-order tournament is illustrated as an incentive mechanism targeting potential 
over-compliant polluters - those already complying with existing environmental regulations but can further 
develop the capacity to exceed such regulatory requirements. Employing partial equilibria in a game theoretic 
framework it is demonstrated that (1) participants have the tendency to over-invest in pollution abatement, 
contrary to the standard result in principal-agent problems where the principal’s choice of contract fails to induce 
an agent’s efficient level of effort;  (2) higher expected returns from the game induce lower emissions for each 
player; and (3) emissions with high risks of negative impacts, or emissions reductions with the most benefits 
should be accorded high prizes in the game; (4) low cost firms achieve a higher environmental improvement than 
high-cost firms for any given standard and prize structure.  A scheme of the nature presented here is attractive in 
several ways: the cost of emissions reductions from ‘losers’ in the game are incurred privately but the benefits of 
these emissions reduction are a public good; it provides firms with a reason to over-comply, without which they 
have no incentive to exceed regulatory requirements. 
Keywords: environmental regulation, incentives, over-compliance, tournaments 
 
A common criticism of command and control approach to environmental regulation, such as emissions or 
technology standards is that regulated firms have little or no incentive to over-comply – that is, to perform 
beyond the requirements of the standard. Over-compliance has the potential to produce significant benefits in the 
form of reduced pollution and its associated negative impacts. With the exception of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) there has been little concerted regulatory effort to specifically target 
and promote over-compliance as a policy objective, by designing and/or implementing policies tailored to firms 
and facilities with the desire and capability to over-comply with established standards. Over-compliance as a 
policy objective is important given that there is substantial evidence of over-compliance; either through 
environmental performance over and above the standard or by adopting and voluntarily complying with specific 
requirements (for examples of voluntary programs, see EPA’s 33/50, WasteWi$e and Green Lights). Several 
reasons have been advanced for over-compliance. The most relevant one to this paper is the desire for firms to 
distinguish themselves from the rest of their peers and therefore benefit from the growing numbers of ‘green’ 
consumers and/or investors. Self-distinction is clearly the target of voluntary approaches to environmental 
regulation, since they serve as a channel to transmit important environmental performance to the public – for 
example, through the use of an eco-label. Leaving aside the significant shortcomings of voluntary compliance as 
over-compliance, what about over-compliance with mandatory standards? Should we encourage over-
compliance with mandatory standards? How can this be done? These are important questions for environmental 
policy; especially with the prime objective of achieving aggregate emissions reductions. It is important to target 
potential over-compliant firms and provide them with some incentives to reduce their emissions beyond the legal 
requirements. We do observe voluntary over-compliance with mandatory standards, which is easier to measure 
but has received little policy attention in the debate on environmental regulation. In this paper, an incentive 
scheme in the form of a tournament is proposed as one possible, simple and market-oriented  approach to 
promote over-compliance. The idea is to design a scheme which separate firms with a strong environmental 
record from the rest of the regulated firms and offer them incentives (prizes in this case) to compete against each 
other. Their over-compliance performance is ranked on an ordinal scale to determine winners and losers.  
The obvious questions are what would motivate firms to join such a scheme? As a participant in the scheme how 
would a firm make its pollution abatement investment decisions? What is the optimal prize structure that 
maximizes returns from the contest? What would be an optimal environmental standard? What would be the 
optimal level of environmental performance? To answer these questions a simple model of a rank order 
tournament, with partial equilibrium analysis is employed.  
 
1.2 Importance of Targeting Over-compliance as a Policy Objective 
If reducing aggregate emissions is the goal of policy, then over-compliance with a mandatory standard plays an 
important role in achieving aggregate emissions reduction. Over-compliance also has the potential to compensate 
for violations of the standard by firms and facilities either with low abatement efforts or inferior technology such 
that emissions reduction targets would still be achieved if the mandatory standard is not achieved by every 
regulated entity. Also, targeting over-compliance as a policy variable has the capacity to motivate polluters to 
undertake new investments in research to develop advanced abatement technologies, and this could have positive 
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externalities within regulated industries. Over-compliance as a policy objective can also be used to help firms 
distinguish themselves among its peers. This has the tendency to enable over-compliant firms to attract a share of 
the ‘green’ consumers and/or investors. An example of a program with a built-in mechanism of this nature is the 
now defunct The National Performance Track (NEPT); a public-private partnership program that operated under 
the EPA’s National Center for Environmental Innovation (NCEI). It was aimed at encouraging facilities with 
strong environmental records to go above and beyond their legal requirements. Members set typically four public, 
measurable three-year goals for continuous improvements in environmental performance beyond their legal 
requirements in areas such as air, water, and land. Members included major corporations, small businesses, and 
public facilities that were steering a course toward environmental excellence. Membership had grown to more 
than 450 facilities in 46 states and Puerto Rico, with more than 1,500 commitments by the time the program was 
shut down in 2010. The shutdown of the program was motivated by significant abuses and inconsistencies 
(Hassell et al, 2010). Design failures transformed it into an inefficient bureaucracy.  
Despite its shortcomings, the popularity of the program suggests a desire or race to over-comply among best 
performing facilities.  "From newspaper headlines to the covers of Fortune 500 reports, we are reading about 
more and more companies working to outdo each other in ‘going green’”3. What did facilities gain by joining 
Performance Track? 
The EPA provided incentives to these facilities in several ways. There were regulatory and administrative 
incentives; for example a reduction in the frequency of reports required under the Maximum Available Control 
Technology (MACT) provisions of the Clean Air Act such that semi-annual reports may be submitted annually, 
expedite the review of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit application renewals 
or modifications held by Performance Track members, Reduced Self-Inspections for Performance Track 
Members, and low priority for routine inspections. Regulatory and administrative incentives were designed to 
reduce a facility’s transaction costs without causing harm to the environment.  
This paper is motivated by two incentives that NEPT provided to members: (1) ‘recognition’ - the program 
recognized best formers in various ways. First, Performance Track gave special awards to a select few members 
who achieved particularly outstanding results in environmental performance (who were also admitted into 
Performance Track Hall of Fame), letters were sent to elected representatives at the local, state, and national 
levels announcing the facility’s acceptance in the program, articles about many of its members were placed in 
trade association journals. (2) ‘green investing’ – NEPT data was readily available to investment research and 
advisory firms who consider environmental and social performance as an indicator to evaluate and rate 
companies. This practice benefits top-performing publicly traded companies that included many Performance 
Track members, by making them more attractive to investors and increasing their brand recognition. 
In this paper performance (or recognition) awards are treated as a rank order tournament. A rank order 
tournament refers to a compensation scheme in which the rewards to contestants are solely based on their 
(ordinal) position and not on the actual size of their output (or contribution). Earnings are dependent on the rank 
order of contestants and not on the output of a particular contestant or the entire game, since prizes are 
determined or fixed in advance. Hence, performance incentives are set by attempts to win the contest.  Unlike in 
marginal analysis, prices (winner and loser prizes in the case of many players) awarded may or may not be worth 
the value of outputs.  
In tournaments, winners receive prizes but in the model to be explored here, the recognition awards and brand 
recognition are treated as prizes. This is particularly important because member facilities recognized the 
market/business value of their efforts as can be identified in some of their testimonials:  
“In terms of bottom line impact, we really weren’t looking for a monetary payback from the program. But we 
have seen monetary payback, certainly, from reduced energy usage and water usage, for example.”  Jack 
Blackmer Coordinator, Novozymes North America“ 
Treating recognition and market value (or brand recognition) as prizes is similar to contests in innovation races 
where the winner of an innovation contest takes the prize in the form of a patent to appropriate the benefits of its 
discovery. Only that in this case increasing ‘green’ market share is the benefit. An important advantage with a 
scheme of this nature is that the cost of emissions reductions from ‘losers’ are incurred privately but the benefits 
are a public good. Another advantage of the scheme is that it provides an incentive to over-compliant firms to 
undertake pollution abatement that would otherwise not be pursued.  
 
1.3 Related Literature 
There is significant literature on the reasons for over-compliance. Arora and Cason (1995, 1996); Arora and 
Gangopadhyay (1995); Videras and Alberini, (2000);  Khanna and Damon (1999) provide evidence on self-
                                                 
3 Press Release (05/09/2007) on: The Performance Track Fifth Annual Progress Report quoting EPA 
Administrator Stephen L. Johnson. 
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distinction in search of ‘green’ public recognition. Barett, 1991; Salop and Scheffman, 1983 argue that firms use 
over-compliance as a means to establish barriers to entry by signaling to the regulator that a higher standard is 
achievable, but at a high cost. While Fri, (1992) argues that over-compliance is used to influence the regulatory 
process or regulation itself, Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett, (1995) show that over-compliance can be used to pre-
empt or even delay regulation. Also, Arora and Cason (1996), suggest that over-compliance may simply be a 
result of lumpy investment in abatement with substantial long run cost savings. The missing piece in the 
literature has been the question of what over-compliance means for policy. It is important to consider how the 
ability and willingness of polluters to over-comply with legal requirements can be leveraged to further reduce 
emissions beyond aggregate achievable emissions reduction goals. The seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
provides a useful guide for motivating potentially over-compliant facilities to invest more on pollution abatement. 
This motivation takes the form of a rank-order tournament – compensation in a game theoretic scheme in which 
the rewards to contestants are solely based on their ordinal position and not the actual size of their output or 
contribution. While there exist sizable empirical and experimental work (for example, see Vulina & Zheng 
(2007); Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987); Camerer and Lovallo (1999); Bull et al (1987); Eriksson et al (2008)) 
on rank-order tournament, applications exploring their usefulness for environmental problems have not been 
pursued. This paper is an attempt to investigate the importance of rank-order tournaments in environmental 
policy. 
 
2. Method 
In this paper, a simple model of a rank order tournament with partial equilibrium analysis is employed, 
in a game theoretic framework. The general form of the model is presented and simplified for convenience and 
ease of analysis to a two-player tournament. 
 
2.1 Model and Results 
Consider a non-cooperative two-stage game with complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, 
compliant firms decide whether or not to expend resources on additional pollution abatement investments that 
qualify them to join the contest. In the second stage, they choose their over-compliance efforts to compete for a 
prize. The model mostly focuses on the second stage of the game, assuming self-selection in the first stage. 
Facilities over-comply relative to some fixed standard, s. Hence, a facility’s over-compliance can be defined by 
 
Where  is the choice of emissions4;  for every firm i in the second stage (  in the first stage of the 
game and any facility with   is not qualified to compete in the game). Over-compliance can be graphically 
illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 1: Over-Compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                   
Assume a performance level (function),  of firm i with  and some error  as its argument.  can be 
expressed as:  
 
Where  is a concave function of . That is, ,  .  is an error term common to all 
firms. The performance level suggests that firms may not necessarily have full control over their emissions, such 
that emissions could be higher or lower than their proposed or planned goal. Brannlund and Lofgren (1996) 
explore this randomness in firms’ emissions. This randomness in performance can also be viewed as error in 
measurement of performance on the part of the regulator. Furthermore, including  is consistent with 
observation of the data on the defunct NEPT, which shows facilities did not always meet their stated goals. The 
standard assumption that the random component is identically and independently distributed, (i.i.d.) across 
individual firms is considered here. That is, 
 is  
                                                 
4 ei can also be assumed to be a class or multiple class of emissions. A single class of emissions makes the 
determination of best performance straight forward, compared to a multiple class of emissions 
ei, s 
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2.2 Prizes and Choice of Pollution Abatement Investments: Two-firm Case, One Fixed Winner-Take-All 
Prize:  
Consider there are only two firms and suppose there is, for simplicity purpose, only one fixed winner-
take-all prize, Z. The regulator independently selects the prize and facilities compete to win (the selection of an 
optimal prize is addressed in the next section ). It can be argued that a more complete prize structure would be 
endogenous in order to account for the benefits of brand recognition from increased exposure (facilitated by 
winning the contest) – this issue is addressed in an extension to this paper. Even an endogenous prize structure 
would depend on the reach of the competition – the ability of the competition and prize to influence the winner’s 
market share. By assuming a fixed prize, it is considered that the effect of competing is stronger than winning; 
such that simply competing distinguishes a facility from a non-participating facility. 
Firms incur over-compliance costs . In a study of plant level data on actual 
and permitted levels of water pollution emissions for the pulp and paper industry, McClelland and Horowitz 
(1999) show that plants do incur substantial costs to over-comply. These costs may be different for different 
firms because both  and  may differ across individual firms and facilities.  It is assumed   is 
same across firms and  is an increasing function of . That is, . However, for 
costs of abatement .  
Firm 1’s utility is defined as: 
                                                                                                                               (1) 
 
Firm 2’s utility is defined in a similar way. The firm or facility with the best performance wins the prize. Hence, 
firm 1 wins the contest if and only if 
                                                                                                (2) 
The probability of winning takes the probit form, a special form of probabilities used in models of discrete 
choice where outcomes embody elements of noise5. Equation (2) can be re-written as 
 
Hence, using the cumulative distribution function of ; the probability of winning the contest becomes: 
 
Note that the probability that firm 1 wins the contest depends not only on its performance,  but also on the 
performance of firm 2. It is assumed here that a firm’s choice of performance goals has a positive but 
diminishing effect on its probability of winning the contest6. In the two-firm case, we can write this as: 
 
 and  
 
Also note that in terms of actual emissions, individual firms increase abatement (low emissions) to increase their 
probability of winning. That is,  
 
 
In a winner-take-all contest, a firm’s expected prize or net payoff from the game is 
 
=  
A risk-neutral firm chooses its performance,  at ei for a given standard (s) to maximize its expected payoff 
from the contest. A firm’s objective function is given by 
   
 
 
The firm’s objective function is concave in  to guarantee that there exists an interior Nash equilibrium 
                                                 
5 An alternative form is the logit form – where randomness in performance is absent. But the probit is well 
appropriate because a great deal of randomness features in many firms’ compliance and over-compliance efforts. 
Also, as indicated earlier, there is evidence that facilities in the NEPT did not always meet their goals. 
6 Dixit (1987) makes the similar assumption in a tournament context with multiple players. 
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. That is, for firm 1:  
 
 
 
 
 
For all        
.   defines the randomness of performance. Hence, it is required that 
 for interior solutions to exist. This means that  is sufficiently 
flat; large increases in firm’s environmental quality improvement goals result in its performance being 
completely random. The weaker case that;  satisfies the two conditions for the 
concavity of the firm’s objective function. In terms of actual emissions, setting goals for distinctively low 
emissions may not be achievable and facilities undertaking such risks to improve their chances of winning the 
contest may experience increased randomness in their performance.  
Remark 1: As standard in the literature, firms choose performance goals to equalize marginal 
abatement expenditures and returns on those expenditures, the expected prize from winning the contest. 
The F.O.C in (3) is    
 
 
                                                                                                  (4) 
Equation (4) implies that a firm’s investments on extra pollution abatement depend on both the prize and their 
ability to affect their chance of winning the contest.  Firms invest in over-compliance up to the point where each 
additional dollar invested equals the expected prize from the contest. Firms affect their chance of winning the 
contest by investing more on pollution abatement. This implies that the regulator can always increase over-
compliance and/or attract new entrants into the game by increasing the prize. A bigger prize induces more 
investments on pollution abatement, either through increased investment by existing firms or increased number 
of firms.  
It is plausible to assume Nash equilibrium conditions in this game. Each firm will then maximize its 
payoff from the competition against the optimum investment decisions of its competitors. In other words, in the 
determination of its pollution abatement investments firm 1 takes  as given. Firm 2 behaves the same way. In 
this sense, equation (4) is also a symmetrical reaction function for the individual firms. Symmetry implies that 
for a Nash solution, . Symmetry also implies that the probability of 
winning the contest is the same for every contestant;  Hence, 
the outcome of the game in Nash equilibrium is completely random. At Nash equilibrium, equation (4) can be 
written as  The expected prize from the contest should be large enough to 
balance the costs of pollution abatement to induce participation in the game. We can graphically illustrate the 
choice facing the firms as follows: 
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Figure 2: Firm’s Choice of Pollution Abatement Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
 
The expected prize function has a negative slope7 – a higher prize is associated with lower emissions.  
At the standard, s, where the expected prize is higher than extra abatement costs to firms, there exist efficiency 
losses associated with the lack of incentive on the part of the firms to over-comply without a reasonable 
expectation of a fair return on the additional abatement effort. Therefore, there exist opportunities to improve 
through further emissions reductions away from the standard. On the graph, firms will increase their 
performance because the expected prize from the contest exceeds the abatement costs incurred. At α*, the 
expected prize equals extra abatement costs. Below α*, firms increase their performance goals but will cut back 
on these goals for any performance levels above α* because they would have overinvested in relation to their 
expected payoffs from those investments.  
Another implication here is that low cost firms achieve a higher environmental improvement than high-
cost firms for any given standard and prize structure. To see this, rotate the abatement cost curve downwards 
(anti-clockwise) – it intersects the expected prize curve at a lower level of emissions or higher performance α. A 
steeper prize function yields a similar result, as shown in the following remark: 
Remark 2: The regulator can induce high environmental quality improvement from firms by awarding a 
larger prize. 
Consider how individual firms respond to the prize, z. Equation (4) implicitly defines firm 1’s choice of 
performance. The first-best efficient level of performance can be written as: 
                                                                                                                           (5) 
Substitute (5) into (4): 
                                                                               (6) 
Differentiate (6) with respect to z. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      (7) 
 
Equation (7) holds because     and . Hence, equation (7) suggests 
that the regulator can set a bigger prize to induce greater environmental improvement from firms. In other words, 
                                                 
7 To see this, differentiate the expected prize with respect to e. That is, 
e
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increasing the prize provides an incentive for firms to further reduce emissions. However, note that increasing 
the prize is costly. 
 
2.3 Optimal Prize and Firm’s Performance 
With the knowledge of how firms would respond to prizes in (4), the regulator can determine an optimal 
prize. To examine how the regulator determines an optimal prize, we first analyze her problem. The subscripts 
are dropped here because the analyses are based on Nash equilibrium outcomes. 
Define a social value function of a level of environmental improvement8,  which is increasing and 
convex in , (but is bounded at some performance level beyond which there are a little or no benefits). That is, 
 , but ; where  is the benefit from a level of environmental quality 
improvement achieved by the standard.  In terms of actual emissions, , and . The regulator 
determines an optimal prize by maximizing the difference between the benefits and costs at the level of 
environmental quality . The costs include damage and abatement investment costs. That is, total damage is 
 with ,  This can be graphically illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 3: Optimum Environmental Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The regulator’s objective function then is: 
                                                                                                                                          (8) 
The regulator chooses a prize, z by maximizing (8) subject to 
                                                                                                         (8a) 
                                                                                  (8b) 
Equation (8a) is the firm’s participation constraint. R is the firm’s fallback position; the payoff from simply 
being in the game and not actively competing for the prize – the equivalent of a consolation prize. This 
constraint must be binding for a firm to enter the contest. Equation (8b) is the firm’s incentive compatibility. 
 
Remark 3: Firms respond by choosing environmental quality improvements above the first-best efficient 
level; over-investing in pollution abatement and hence over performing. 
Substitute (8a) and (8b) into (8) to obtain; 
                                                                                                                   (9) 
Assuming equation (8a) is binding, the first-order condition in (9) is 
 
 
                                                     (10) 
 
Note that  according to (4). An efficient level of performance (α) requires 
. But since  , equation (10) is true if and only if 
 
= . 
It can then be concluded here that (8b) ( ) exceeds the efficient level of 
environmental quality. The prize, Z chosen by the regulator does induce the firm to choose a level of 
environment quality beyond the first-best efficient level of performance. Firms choose emissions below the first-
best level. That is,  implying that .  
This over performance arises from the desire to win the contest. Firms make abatement choices 
according to (4), in which the regulator determines z but the firm chooses lower emissions or a higher α to 
                                                 
8 Similarly, think of )(ab as benefits of emissions/pollution control. 
)(aD  
Environmental 
Quality 
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increase its probability of winning the contest. This conclusion is contrary to the standard result in principal-
agent problems where the principal’s choice of contract does not induce the agent to choose an efficient level of 
effort; a problem that arises from information asymmetry; particularly incomplete information.  
Tournaments solve this problem of incomplete information by removing the need for principal to have 
knowledge of the agent’s choice of action. A tournament allows the firm to choose abatement investments 
according to (4). Its ability to win the contest depends on its choice of performance, α and its associated costs. 
Unlike in standard principal-agent problems, it suffices that a firm observe z and set performance level and costs 
to win the contest. The regulator is not obliged to know  before setting the prize, z.  
 
Remark 4: The optimal prize is increasing in both the benefit of, and damage caused by a level of 
environmental quality  ) 
 
To see this, note that optimal z requires that the first-order condition in (9) equals zero. That is, 
 
 
 
 
 
 Differentiate  with respect to  and . 
 
 
 
 
 
These conditions hold because  , , and . Hence, the optimal prize is 
increasing in both the benefit of, and damage caused by a level of environmental quality. This conclusion has 
important policy implications; it suggests that pollution activities with higher potential benefits of environmental 
improvement or with higher risks of pollution effects should be allocated higher prizes in the contest.  
 
3. Conclusions and Discussion 
In this paper, a rank-order tournament scheme has been proposed as an incentive mechanism to target 
those firms that are believed to better position to deploy additional resources to exceed regulatory requirements 
and achieve better levels of environmental quality. This type of a scheme is very suitable for pollutants that are 
difficult to control but that have significant impacts on the environment. The firm’s response to the optimal prize 
structure instituted by the regulator in a simple tournament has been examined and the results indicate that 
participants have the tendency to over-invest in pollution abatement.  
We have examined firms’ abatement decisions and the results show that individual participants make 
abatement decisions by balancing abatement cost against expected returns from winning the contest. 
Furthermore, higher expected returns from the game induce lower emissions for each player. The effect of the 
optimal prize on environmental quality has been analyzed. The result is that missions with high risks of negative 
impacts, or emissions reductions with the most benefits should be accorded high prizes in the game. A scheme of 
the nature presented here is attractive in several ways: the cost of emissions reductions from ‘losers’ in the game 
are incurred privately but the benefits of these emissions reduction are a public good. 
The key message here may not necessarily be that only lump sum cash prizes be used as an 
environmental policy tool. In a more realistic approach, similar results can be achieved if various categories of 
investors are given the tools and incentives to influence the abatements choices of firms. For example, tax credits 
on “green” investments can have direct effects on investment decisions. Firms would “compete” for these 
(“Green”) investments from potential investors - the prize in this case.  An important advantage with a scheme of 
this nature is that the cost emissions reductions from ‘losers’ are incurred privately but the benefits are a public 
good. Another advantage of the scheme is that it provides an incentive to over-compliant firms to undertake 
pollution abatement that would otherwise not be pursued.  
A further area for research on the scheme presented here includes the effect of a prize structure that is 
endogenous. It is apparent from the literature on over-compliance that facilities are increasingly adopting and 
exceeding regulatory requirements in ways that build added value to their business. This value added, intuitively, 
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qualifies as a prize. Furthermore, the model developed here assumes that facilities are not monitored. It may be 
worth examining the effect of enforcement (and enforcement costs) on optimal performance. 
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